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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
8835

DAVID BRAEGGER, JOHN R. LARKIN, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We will adopt the same nomenclature as did the appellant in its brief and we are in agreement with the statement of facts as therein set out as a general proposition.
In support of our argument as to specific points, we will
refer specifically to parts of the record and we will add a
few additional references in support of that argument.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

POINT II.
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AS TO SEVERANCE DAMAGES WERE ADEQUATE AND
THE EVIDENCE OFFERED SUSTAINS THE
JURY'S AWARD OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE.

POINT III.
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM
CONSIDERATION BY THE JURY CLAIMED
BENEFITS TO THE LANDS NOT TAKEN.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

We can neither follow nor agree with the appellant's
analysis of the manner in which the witness, Capener,
arrived at his figures as to value. No witness for either
party placed any value on the water rights owned by re·
spondents and it was stipulated that the jury would no1
consider water and that none was being condemned (R. 34)
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However, appellant now seeks to place a value upon it based
upon some theory that its value is reflected in what the
respondents paid for a part of it a good many years ago.
This is an objectionable and improper assumption.
It is a basic concept of the law of eminent domain that
the landowner whose land is being condemned, is entitled
to the value of that land for its highest and best use. Moyle
v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P. 2d 882; State v.
Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630. The highest and best
use of respondents' land was for the production of crops
and the use of water for irrigating those crops was an
indispensable part of that production.
If the appellant had sought to condemn both the land
and the water, respondents would have been entitled to an
additional amol)nt of damage for the water. It is clear and
beyond any reasonable doubt that all of the appraisers were
viewing the respondents' lands as irrigated crop producing
lands and that their values did not include any separate
figure for the water rights. And the instructions of the
Court fully covered this phase of the case as did the Court's
remarks at the beginning of the trial.
The case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District
v. Skeen, decided by this Court on August 4, 1958, and not
yet reported, holds :
"The jury had the benefit of opinions from
three qualified experts as to the value of the· land.
Although these opinions varied considerably it is
within the prerogative of the jury to believe whom
it chooses, and it chose to believe defendants' expert
rather than plaintiff's. On cross examination of the
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two experts, called by plaintiff, some doubt was cast
on the thoroughness of their inspection of the land,
and this may well have affected the jury's consideration of their lower evaluations."
Each statement in the foregoing quotation is equally applicable to the present case.
In addition, and as commented on by the trial judge
at page 287 of the Record, there was competent evidence
that the respondents were losing valuable hunting rights
and privileges by the taking of their properties. Although
no witness expressed an opinion as to the monetary value
of these rights, there was uncontradicted evidence that they
were valuable. 15 Am. Jur. on Damages, Sec. 356 at page
795, states the rule:
"Where the law presumes that the plaintiff
suffered substantial damage from the alleged wrongful act, it is not necessary for him to prove damages
in any specific or certain amount in order to recover
damages for a substantial amount."
POINT II.
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AS TO SEVERANCE DAMAGES WERE ADEQUATE AND
THE EVIDENCE OFFERED SUSTAINS THE
JURY'S AWARD OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE.
On page 13 of appellant's brief, there is a quotation
from Stnte v. Coopera-tive Secu.rity Corp., 122 Utah 134, 247
P. 2d 269. We adopt that quotation and feel that it correctly states the law that severance damage cannot be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
awarded unless there is evidence that no comparable land
is available to replace that taken by the condemnor.
We would call this Court's attention to page 35 of the
Record. The respondent offered evidence that would have
shown that there was no comparable land available. The
trial court, upon appellant's objection, refused to receive
such evidence. We do not believe that appellant can now
urge that it was error for the trial court to have sustained
his objection. It was not, therefore, error to refuse to give
the instruction that appellant requested.
As to the state land lease, it is clear from the record
that the witness, Capener, included $1,000.00 severance
damages not for the "taking away of the State lease", but
because the condemnation proceeding effectively made that
said lease ineffective as any part of the new farm unit
that would be left for operation by respondents. It was,
without any doubt, a proper item of severance damage.
POINT III.
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM
CONSIDERATION BY THE JURY CLAIMED
BENEFITS TO THE LANDS NOT TAKEN.
We urge upon this Court that the trial judge acted
properly in this respect for three sound reasons. First,
there were no pleadings and no issue raised as to alleged
benefits. Second, proper objection was made and there was
no foundation laid for the evidence of value of the benefits
as testified to by the witness. And third, the benefits testified to were general and not special.
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As to the first reason above mentioned, we believe it
to be self-evident and in need of no further comment.
As to the second, we would call specific attention to
the objection made and the ruling of the trial court as
shown at page 279 of the Record. The witness, Warnick,
was a civil engineer with twenty years experience with
the United States Bureau of Reclamation. There is not a
scintilla of evidence that he had had any experience in valuation and appraising or that he had ever done so before.
He did not qualify as an expert and no foundation was
laid for his evidence and it would have been error to have
permitted a jury to speculate with this type of evidence.
The third reason is, of course, the most important. We
believe the best distinction between general and special
benefits to be contained in 43 Iowa Law Review at page
305, where it is stated:
"Special benefits are defined as those that accrue directly to the particular tract in question because of its peculiar relation to the public improvement. General benefits are termed as those that
accrue to lands generally in the vicinity because of
the improvement."
We invite the Court's attention to this article in the
Io\va Law Review and to the cases there cited and also to
the annotation in 145 A. L. R. commencing at page 7, with
particular emphasis as to the language on page 49 where
special benefits are defined as those peculiar to the property
in litigation.
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In the case of Salt Lake & Utah R. R. Co. v. Butterfield,
46 Utah 431, 150 Pac. 931, the trial court charged the jury
as follows:
"In determining the question as to whether any
benefits have accrued to _the remaining portion of
the land by reason of the construction and operation of the railroad on the land taken, you should not
take into consideration any benefits shared by the
defendants as owners of this land with the community in general, but only such benefits as are special
to this particular property."
The Court then proceeds :
"In a much later case, namely, in Beveridge v.
Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 Pac. 1040, 70 Pac. 1083, 59
L. R. A. 581, 92 Am. St. Rep. 188, the rule adopted
by this court is the one that is enforced in the latter
case. In that case the court, in referring to the question now under consideration, says:
" 'General benefits consist in an increase in the
value of land common to the community generally,
from advantages which will accrue to the community
from the improvement. Lewis on Eminent Domain,
§ 471. They are conjectural and incapable of estimation. They may never be realized, and in such case
the property owner has not been compensated save
by the sanguine promise of the promoter.'
"The court then defines special as contradistinguished from general benefits and says that general
benefits, as a rule, are based upon what the court
calls the chance of increase in value by increased
population and by increased facilities of transportation, etc. The court then proceeds :
" 'This chance for gain is the property of the
landowner. If a part of his property is taken for the
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construction of the railway, he stands in reference
to the other property not taken like similar property
owners in the neighborhood. His neighbors are not
required to surrender this prospective enhancement
of value in order to secure the increased facilities
which the railroad will afford. If he is compelled
to contribute all that he could possibly gain by the
improvement, while others in all respects similarly
affected by it are not required to do so, he does not
receive the equal protection of the law.' "
In the case of Shurtleff v. Salt Lake City, 96 Utah 21,
82 P. 2d 561, the fourth syllabus reads as follows:
"In determining damage sustained by water
right owner on city's appropriation of water rights
for culinary purposes, substitution of culinary water
with other waters could not be considered on theory
of benefits to water right owner's land."
Even if the evidence that was offered by the appellant
as to the value of the benefits had been proper, such evidence was directed to general benefits and not to special
benefits. The trial court properly excluded the same from
consideration by the jury.
A recent Louisiana case, East Baton Rouge Parish
Cou11cil v. Koller, 94 So. 2d 505, is directly in point and the
following quotation from it shows not only the similarity
in fact but the applicable rule of la'v:
"Plaintiff parish council finally urges that the
award should be reduced by disallowing any damages to the property not taken, since even defendant
landowner's witnesses agree that the project will
cause defendant's lot to increase in value because
of the better drainage afforded it and the lesser
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danger of flooding. That is, it is urged that the
damages to the remaining land should be offset by
the benefits accruing from the drainage project.
"But the testimony is uncontradicted that such
benefits as will accrue will also accrue to all other
property in the area, whether or not abutting the improvement. These are general benefits to all property concerned, not special to Koller's property.
" 'General benefits [resulting from construction
of the work] are those which are shared alike by all
property owners in the neighborhood or community.
Such damage as a property owner may sustain as a
result of the construction and use of a public work
cannot be offset by these general benefits. The reason is that the citizen whose property is taken cannot be compelled to bear more of the cost of the
public improvement and general benefits resulting
therefrom than is borne by other property owners
whose property is neither taken nor damaged for
the public purpose,' Louisiana Highway Commission
v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 2 So. 2d 654 at page 660; Oleck,
Damages to Persons and Property, Section 225; 29
C. J. S., Verbo Eminent Domain, § 183b, p. 1064."
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of the jury
and the judgment entered thereon is fully supported by
competent evidence, that no error was committed by the
trial court, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE M. MASON,
JOSEPH C. FOLEY,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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